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1 Introduction
One of the ways for individuals to influence political decisions is through a lobby group membership.
Lobby groups collect the membership fees, and via contributions to the incumbent government, they
attempt to impact its policy implementation. This paper aims to model the environmental lobby
groups and producer lobbies to determine the outcome on emission levels and environmental policies
in a large open economy set-up. We consider two large countries engaged in a free trade agreement,
experiencing environmental problems from both, local and transboundary pollution.
Lobbying represents an important part of the political process in some countries. Lobby groups
contributed over $2 million to the presidential candidates in the 2012 US elections, while in the 2008
elections, the contributions crossed the $5 million1. Although relatively small in size compared to
the total raised contributions, the lobby gives a monetary amount to the government with a precise
objective to influence policy, and moreover, the green lobbyists and attorneys assist the government
oﬃcials to create legislation involving environmental protection. Furthermore, the numbers listed
above are only the contributions listed as from "lobbyists": much more coming from individual
members of diﬀerent societies, industries, and organizations. These individual political oﬀerings do
not classify as lobby contributions by the agency enclosing the information regarding the election
donations, but we shall consider them within our model. It is also important to note that the envi-
ronmental non-governmental organizations, whether international, continental, or local, have grown
in numbers and size in the past years. To list only a few examples, there is about sixty oﬃcial large
international environmental non-governmental agencies; for the national green organizations, there
are over 110 in the US, around 40 agencies in United Kingdom, three in China, all fighting to protect
and conserve the environment locally, involved in environmental management, advocacy, or raising
awareness and influencing policies connected to the climate change and other global environmental
problems in general. For the most influential international green lobby groups, Greenpeace received
e202.5 in 2008 from 2.6 million of contributors around the world. Another possibility to create an
alliance to fight global problems is to link multiple national green organizations: the Climate Action
Network connects more than 850 non-governmental organizations in 90 countries. For the national
environmental lobby groups, the Environmental Defense Fund’s revenue in 2011 was $ 98 million,
1From www.opensecrets.org
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with over 700,000 members2. In this paper, we also capture the concept of local lobby groups, fight-
ing local environmental problems. There exist numerous local lobby groups fighting for preserving
wilderness, opposing nuclear power and nuclear weapons, or concerned with contamination of ground
water or air pollution.
This paper explores the impact of the pressure from the environmental lobby groups on the
environmental tax. We study multiple diﬀerent formations of the lobbies: national green lobby
cares about the pollution influencing home environment, local greens lobby exclusively for the lower
pollution at home, and finally the supergreens experience the disutility from the transboundary
pollution. Additionally, we check the influence of the producer lobby groups, and find that if the
pollution is transboundary and spillover eﬀects are large, the national green lobby and supergreens
fight for the same environmental policy as the producer lobby. However, the local greens will
always fight for strict policies. We rely on the previous research when modeling the lobby influence,
especially the work of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995), the common agency model of Bernheim
and Whinston (1986), and the research on the green lobby problematic described in the following
lines.
The lobbying for environmental protection has been explored especially in 1990s and at the
beginning of the 2000s. Most of the literature focuses on the interaction between small economies.
Persson (2012) looks at the consequences from negotiations between small open economies experienc-
ing environmental problems from transboundary pollution. He finds that if the green lobby groups
in one country care about pollution more than the other country does, they are willing to accept
more pollution at home as a result of lower than expected tax if the foreign pollution decreases due
to the foreign introduction of the pollution tax. The author assumes that the agreement between
two governments is reached as it ensures higher welfare for both countries, and the pollution tax
depends on the welfare level achieved from bargaining process in both countries. Unlike the earlier
literature discussing solely unilateral or cooperative policies, Persson’s paper is focused on demon-
strating how the environmental tax reacts if the policies are set as a result of negotiated agreement
between two governments. Persson does not consider the case when the governments do not engage
in a negotiation process and implement the environmental tax unilaterally, which we shall discusses
in this paper.
2From the websites of the individual lobby groups and the Internet
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Other published research in the topic explores the imperfect competition model with international
mobility of pollution where environmentalists are relatively concerned with the pollution abroad (see
Aidt 2005). The immobile pollution is defined as the pollution which is mostly deposited within the
country where it was created, while mobile pollution is deposited in both: the neighboring country
and the country of creation. The increase of the environmental tax in the home country while the
pollution is mobile will induce lowering pollution in both countries; while with immobile pollution,
the green lobby will accept reducing the tax on pollution at home for the lower pollution abroad if
the home lobbyists care suﬃciently enough about pollution abroad. Aidt (2005) avoids the need of
use of the emission leakage issue in order to show the results. The idea of the mobility of pollution is
partially applied in our work; however, the reasoning for the results in Aidt (2005) are not compelling
and logical as he assumes that the local green lobby cares very highly about local pollution in the
foreign country. This problem will be tackled in our work.
In most of the other cases, previous literature on lobbying in small open economies with local
pollution indicates that increase in green lobbying leads to higher pollution taxes. For example,
Fredriksson (1997b) introduced the tax elasticity of pollution, and found that unless the green
lobby group’s share of total pollution tax revenue decreases with increasing tax, the eﬀect of green
lobbying on the pollution tax is unambiguously positive. In the work of Aidt (1998), the consumer
experiences the disutility from pollution, and each industry can organize a producer lobby that
campaigns for subsidy and tax levels. Aidt finds that the emissions produced by industry k are
greater than the Pigouvian level if this industry is organized, lower otherwise. If all sectors are
organized, the government chooses the tax rate replicating the social optimum. In the presence of
green lobbying, the tax is greater than the Pigovian adjustment, as both government and green
lobby care about the pollution. The work by Fredriksson and Aidt gives insight into diﬀerent lobby
group influence and tax-setting, but does not consider the problem of international agreements,
transboundary pollution, or emission leakage. In this work, we consider both green and producer
lobby groups, with transboundary and local pollution, and address the question of the rising lobby
influence on the emission levels.
One of the very few publications on large open economies with green lobby groups where the
author addresses the emission leakage problem is by Conconi (2003), who analyzed the lobby group
influence on the environmental tax in diﬀerent trade regimes for unilateral and centralized decision
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making. Conconi’s goal is to highlight a need for an international environmental agency, as she
proves that when the countries are bounded by free trade agreements and do not coordinate the
environmental policy, and moreover if the spillover eﬀects of the pollution and the terms of trade
are suﬃciently big, then the increase of the proportion of environmentalist in the country will cause
a decrease in the pollution tax. The environmental leakage plays an important role in the analyses:
the contradictory result arises from the fact that since the tax on goods rises, and as a result the
home producer price goes up, then, the production drops. As we are in the large economy set-up,
due to the price increase at home, also the international price rises depending on the elasticity of
production and imports/exports of both countries. Then, the foreign country, whose producer price
remains the same, is able to produce more to satisfy the demand of the home market where the
production is smaller due to the higher price. The policy outcomes are evaluated for multiple lobby
group cases: national greens who care about pollution at home, international greens, whose objective
is to maximize the sum of the utilities of the greens in both countries, and finally national green and
producer lobbies that experience disutility from home pollution and care about rents, respectively.
Conconi’s research opens up to other research possibilities. Our work relies on Conconi’s previous
results, and explores the diﬀerent lobby groups in a free trade scenario, when the country raises the
tax unilaterally, and when it achieves an agreement with the other country. We would like to find
out what happens to the tax and emissions when the country becomes greener. The addition of this
work to the discussion on the topic of environmental lobbying is in modeling the local and global
lobby groups, both considering diﬀerent type of pollution. Moreover, Conconi showed that the tax
can be possibly smaller if the number of environmentalists in the country increases, which we show is
not true for the local lobby group. Additionally, Conconi did not follow the analyses further to show
the influence of this change on the emissions and the importance of the aggregate social welfare,
which are addressed in this paper.
We describe the model in the next section, and list the results of environmental lobbying on the
policy that the government implements in the section 3. We look at the unilateral choice of policies,
and check the influence of individual lobby groups when they act by themselves, and then we verify
the tax level for the case when the greens lobby together with the producers. Additionally, we check
the case for the cooperative policies, change of the weight of the aggregate social welfare, and explore
the role of assymetries. The section 4 concludes.
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2 Model
Let us consider a global economy with two large countries, home and foreign, the later denoted by a
star (*). The countries are bounded by a free trade agreement and are negatively influenced by the
emission from its own as well as foreign production process. We assume the absence of international
environmental regulatory agency.
2.1 Production
Each country produces N + 1 goods, i = 0, 1, ..., N where the good i = 0 is the non-polluting
numeraire produced using linear technology with labor as the only input, and traded freely on the
international markets. Each good i is produced by exactly one industry, which keeps the same
subscript. The production of the rest of the goods requires labor and sector specific input; the goods
are produced with constant returns to scale technology. All goods are tradable on the international
markets. The price of the numeraire good is chosen to be equal to 1 on both home and foreign
markets, and the wage is also normalized to 1 in both countries. The domestic price for non-
numeraire goods the consumer pays is q = (pW1 , ..., pWn ), which is also the world market price,
while producer price is p = (p1, ..., pn) = (pW1   t1, ..., pWn   tn) where ti is the tax imposed by the
government on the industries producing polluting goods and pWi is, as mentioned earlier, the price
for good i on the international market. Then, the tax revenue from the pollution tax is given by
the sum of the tax collected from taxing each good.
NP
i=1
tixi and is redistributed uniformly to all
individuals in the country.
In the production sector of the economy, the firms are earning a rent Ri(pi) from producing the
good i. The supply function of the industry is defined from the Hotelling’s lemma as Yi(pi) = @Ri@pi .
Production process in each of the sectors i = 1, ..., N generates emissions Ei = ↵iYi where ↵i is an
exogenously given sector specific coeﬃcient measuring the amount of the pollution associated with
the production of good i. The emissions can damage local environment or they might cause global
environmental problems.
The ✓iEi is the part of emissions from the production at home that damages the local environ-
ment, while (1   ✓i)Ei is the transboundary pollution. Here, ✓i is a coeﬃcient between zero and
one, standing for how much of the emissions produced by the industry i is local, while the rest of
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emissions create transboundary environmental problems; if pollution is strictly local, then the second
term of the equation (1) vanishes, and for perfectly transboundary pollution, ✓i = 0. Similarly, for
the foreign country, the emissions damaging their local environment are ✓⇤iE⇤i and the transboundary
pollution produced abroad is represented by (1  ✓⇤i )E⇤i . Then, the function of total emission in the
country is a sum of all emissions produced by home industries and only global emissions produced
abroad:
Z =
NX
i=1
✓iEi(pi) + (1  ✓i) (Ei(pi) + E⇤i (p⇤i )) (1)
Here, we assumed for simplicity that the emissions produced by the industry i are influencing local
environment and producing the transboundary pollution the same way as the industry i in the foreign
country, i.e. ✓i = ✓⇤i . It is now possible to see that function of the global environmental problems
is a sum of the transboundary pollution produced at home and abroad, while local problems are a
burden only for the country which produces them.
2.2 Consumption
On the consumer side of our model, we normalize the population in the home country to one. Each
individual enjoys utility from consumption and experiences disutility from pollution damaging home
environment; their preferences are quasilinear and additively separable. The utility function for the
representative agent is independent of the membership in the lobby group and is represented as
follows:
uh(c0, c1, ..., cN , Z) = c0 +
NX
i=1
ui(ci)  Z (2)
where c0 is the consumption of the numeraire good and ci is the consumption of the non-numeraire
goods. The utility function u(c) is twice diﬀerentiable, increasing, and strictly concave.
The consumers pay the price pWi , which is the price for good i on the international market, while
the producers pay the tax as the producer price is given by pi = pWi   ti. Then, the demand for
good i is a function of price: Di(pWi ), and the imports (or exports ifMi is negative) are simply given
by Mi(pWi , pi) = Di(pWi )  Yi(pi). It is possible to derive the world equilibrium prices as a function
of the tax policies in both countries: pWi (ti, t⇤i ) as in the equilibrium, the world markets clear and
Mi +M⇤i = 0. Note we do not consider any trade costs.
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2.3 Emission Leakage
The emission leakage problematic arises when a country introduces stricter environmental policy
than the foreign country, which increases its production, and therefore emissions. In this section,
we use the results of Conconi’s analyses, who found that the change of the price when we increase
the tax can be expressed by the equation:
@pWi
@ti
⌘  i = ✏
Y
i
mi
⇥
✏Mi   ✏M⇤i (pi/p⇤i )
⇤ (3)
This relation is the ratio between price elasticity of domestic supply and import elasticity mul-
tiplied by the import-to-GDP share mi ⌘ MiYi . The price elasticity of domestic supply is defined by
✏Yi ⌘  @Yi@pi
pi
Yi
, and the price elasticity of import demand (or export supply if Mi is negative) are
defined by ✏Mi ⌘ @Mi@pi
pi
Mi
, with M⇤ and p⇤i for ✏⇤i M . This increase  i is always between 0 and 1.
The unilateral increase of the domestic tax on production of the good i will have a negative
impact on the emissions produced at home, and a positive influence on the production abroad, and
therefore also emissions, as the comparative advantage shifts towards foreign country. The emissions
produced by the domestic industries will unambiguously decrease:
@Ei
@ti
= ( i   1)↵i@Yi
@pi
while the foreign emissions will increase:
@E⇤i
@ti
=  i↵
⇤
i
@Y ⇤i
@p⇤i
Then, we have that the pollution at home changes with the change of tax:
@Z
@t
= (    1)↵@Y
@p
+ (1  ✓) ↵⇤@Y
⇤
@p⇤
(4)
The equation (4) consists of two terms. The first represents the direct eﬀect of the tax increase,
which produces the domestic emission reduction, and the second term is the indirect eﬀect of the
unilateral tax policy, and causes the transboundary foreign emissions to rise. The pollution in the
home country will increase despite an increase in the pollution tax if the indirect eﬀect is bigger
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than the direct eﬀect. Taking symmetric countries, the emission leakage takes place if  (2  ✓) > 1.
Recent research on the topic of environmental taxation has shown that the government will
adopt lower than the optimal tax if the pollution is transboundary, while for the local pollution, the
implemented tax control is at its maximum level, as analyzed by Anoulies (2012). Anoulies showed
that as the local pollution is taxed fully, the firms have an incentive to relocate their production to
environmentally lax countries, while the cost of transboundary pollution is born by multiple countries
therefore, the tax is lower. Other literature (see Barrett 1998) also proves that the taxes introduced
by the welfare-maximizing government on the production creating transboundary pollution are lower
that it is optimal; moreover, in the presence of environmental leakage, the equilibrium tax will be
even lower. Considering these results, we would like to check if the presence of the green lobby
groups influences the tax level in the opposite way and if we can recover the tax level equal to the
Pigouvian tax that would be present if there were no lobbies present. Our expectation is that the
green lobby will fight for higher taxes, which could mean that the pollution in the home country
increases in the presence of emission leakage as described above.
2.4 Lobby Groups
We consider three diﬀerent formations of the lobby groups. We assume that some of the individuals
in the economy are aﬀected by the pollution more than others, and they join a green lobby. The
producers have an incentives to form a lobby on their own. Moreover, we assume that all the indi-
viduals who are aﬀected by the pollution more than the rest of the society overcome the free-rider
problem. First, the national green lobby group cares about pollution at home and maximizes only its
own welfare function; in the second case, the local greens care about local pollution damage while
global greens (supergreens) care about the transboundary pollution produced by both countries,
maximizing the welfare of supergreen lobby group, who exercise the pressure on its own government
in the unilateral policy set-up. Lastly, a producer lobby group is added to the second case, and it
cares about maximizing the rents from the production of the polluting good.
Case 1: The welfare of the national green lobby group (NG) is
WNG(t, t⇤) = A  aNGZ(t, t⇤) 
X
j
Cj(t, t
⇤) (5)
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where A is a constant, aNG is the proportion of the national greens in the population, and
P
j
Cj(t, t⇤)
is the sum of the contributions of the members of the green lobby group, j 2 NG. The function
Z(t, t⇤) is the same as it was defined in (1).
Case 2: The welfare of the local greens group that care only about local pollution is
WLG(t) = A1   aLG✓E(t) 
X
j
Cj(t) j 2 LG (6)
with ✓E(t) being the pollution influencing only the local environment.
The welfare of the supergreens is
WGG(t, t⇤) = A2   aGGZG(t, t⇤) 
X
j
Cj(t, t
⇤) j 2 GG (7)
where ZG(t, t⇤) =
NP
i=1
(1   ✓i) (Ei(pi) + E⇤i (p⇤i )). Here, A1, A2 are constants and aLG, aGG are the
proportions of the population organized into the particular lobby group. Note that here, the local
greens do not have the same objective function as the national greens in the case 1. The local greens
care exclusively about the local environmental problems, while national experience disutility from
all the pollution aﬀecting their country. Supergreens, on the other hand, cannot consider particular
environmental problems, and only the transboundary pollution enters their welfare function. In
the previous research, the international green lobby groups considered the total pollution in both
countries (see Conconi 2003).
Lastly, the third case includes the producer lobby groups. Assuming that the members of these
groups are the owners of the production factors, they care about the rents they earn from production
of the good that requires this particular factor. The members pay the contributions to their lobby
group. Not all owners of the factors are necessarily organized. The fraction of the factor owners that
is organized is denoted by L. Then, we can define the welfare of the individual producer lobby group
owning the factor i, with aPi being the proportion of the population comprised of the members of
the production sector i, as follows:
WP (t, t⇤) = aPi Ri(pi)  Ci(ti, t⇤i ) i 2 L (8)
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We assume that the contribution schedules of all lobby groups maximize their welfare function
and are feasible. The contributions cannot be negative, but can be zero if the lobby group believes its
contribution will not aﬀect or sustain the policy. The funding for the contributions comes from the
individual income, and reflects in the government welfare function as explained in the next section.
2.5 Government
To solve the maximization problem of the government, which will determine the optimal tax, we
set-up the objective function that follows the Helpman and Grossman (1994, 1995) equilibrium
representation. The incumbent government’s ultimate goal is to get reelected, and for this reason,
it cares about the contributions and the welfare of the consumers. The government welfare can be
then represented as follows:
G(t, t⇤) = !W (t, t⇤) +
X
k
Ck(t, t
⇤) (9)
where k represents the lobby group: k = {NG} in case 1, k = {LG} and k = {GG} in case 2, and
finally, k = {LG,GG,P} for the third case. The weight the government places on the aggregate
domestic welfare is denoted by !. The domestic welfare is the sum of aggregate income, tax revenue,
total rent, and total consumer surplus minus the environmental damage:
W (t, t⇤) ⌘ l +
NX
i
tiYi(pi, p
⇤
i ) +
NX
i
Ri(pi) +
"
NX
i
ui(Di(p
W
i )) 
NX
i
qiDi(p
W
i )
#
  Z(t, t⇤) (10)
As mentioned in the lobby group section, the contribution schedule comes from the income I, and
therefore reflects in the domestic welfare. We write:
G(t, t⇤) = µ1
"
W (t, t⇤) 
X
k
Ck(t, t
⇤)
#
+ µ2
X
k
Ck(t, t
⇤)
which is the same as setting ! = µ1µ2 µ1 and maximizing the function (9). To set the tax on pollution,
the governments engage in a political talk as described in the next section.
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2.6 Political Game
The governments can cooperate, i.e select the same policies as the supranational organization would
through maximization of the weighted sum of the national welfares. Otherwise, the governments
remain in the uncooperative equilibrium, and implement their policies unilaterally. As in Grossman
and Helpman (1994, 1995), the political process is modeled as a two stage game. In the first stage, the
lobby groups oﬀer their campaign contribution schedule to the government, taking the contributions
of the other lobby groups as given, acting simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The lobby group
is assumed to fulfill its promises and pay the amount of the contributions in the second stage.
The government, facing various lobby group contributions, chooses a vector of taxes by maximizing
its own welfare (9). In the second stage, the governments choose their environmental policies,
unilaterally or cooperatively. The non-cooperative game’s solution between two governments is
given by a subgame perfect equilibrium.
From the maximization of the joint welfare of each lobby and the government, and the utility
maximization of the government, we get that with the small change in policy, the change of the
amount of the contributions is the same as the eﬀect of the change on the lobby’s gross welfare:
@Ck(t)
@t =
@Wk(t,t⇤)
@t . Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995) and Bernheim and Whinston (1986) call
this property "local truthfulness", and it corresponds to the marginal willingness to pay for a change
in the tax policy. The derivation of this property is Grossman and Helpman (1994). Dixit (1996),
and Fredriksson (1997(b)). We proceed with computation of the optimal tax for each of our cases of
the lobby groups, in a cooperative and unilateral decision process, and check the change in emissions
produced, and see the influence of the increase of the green lobby membership on the results.
3 Environmental Policy in the Presence of Green Lobbying
The main goal of this paper is to show how the presence of diﬀerent lobby groups influences the
environmental policy in a free-trade policy regime. Due to the possible eﬀect of the emission leakage,
the environmental degradation can increase even if the tax on pollution rises. We would like to check
if this result is balanced out when the green lobby groups are present. To do so, we use the exogenous
change in proportion of the lobby group members in the country’s population.
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3.1 Unilateral Policy Choice
First, we focus on the situation when the environmental tax is introduced by the home country only.
To start, the countries are assumed to be symmetric. The asymmetry is discussed later in this work.
The derivation of the equilibrium tax is explained in detail in the appendix.
3.1.1 Case 1: National Lobby Group
Suppose there exist only one lobby group which cares about the pollution aﬀecting the home country.
The government then sets the optimal tax in the home country equal to:
t =
↵
 
! + aNG
 
(2    ✓    1)
! (    1)
If the proportion of environmentalists aNG in the home country increases, it will have an ambiguous
eﬀect on the tax as
@t
@aNG
=
↵(2     ✓   1)
!(    1)
is negative if  (2 ✓) > 1, and therefore has an opposite eﬀect as expected. The condition is therefore
fulfilled if the "transboundarity" of the pollution is large, so ✓ close to zero, and the spillover eﬀects
  are big enough. For perfectly transboundary pollution, it is suﬃcient that the eﬀect on the
international price is   > 1/2 in order for the tax to fall with the increase of the environmentalists.
The lobby group cares about the emissions, as the total pollution at home will influence its
utility function. The condition for the emissions to increase even if higher tax is introduced in the
equation (4) is  (2   ✓) > 1, which coincides with the condition when this environmental group
lobbies for lower taxes. Therefore, in the presence of emission leakage where the pollution in the
home country increases due to the high emission of the transboundary pollutants by the foreign
country, the increase in the national green lobby group membership will push the tax down if there
is the risk of the foreign country polluting the home environment. The national green lobby ensures
that the pollution in the home country does not increase. This result is coherent with the rationality
of the lobby group.
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3.1.2 Case 2: Local Greens and Supergreens
Now we consider two green lobby groups: local greens whose objective is to impose a tax on locally
polluting industries, and supergreens, with the objective of the government tackling the transbound-
ary pollution. First, we determine the optimal tax if these lobbies act alone in the home country;
in the case 3, we explore the situation if they act together.
The pressure from the local greens will result in the implementation of the following tax:
t =
aLG↵✓
!
+
↵ (2    ✓    1)
    1
which changes when the lobby proportion increases, and will result in unambiguously higher taxes:
@t
@aLG
=
✓↵
!
The increase in tax on the locally polluting good will increase the international price by the amount
 , and decrease the production at home. On the other hand, the pollution in the foreign country, due
to increase of production, rises. As   2 (0, 1), the pollution in the foreign country rises by smaller
amount than it fell in the home country. From the equation (4) it is evident that as the pollution
is local, so ✓ is close to 1; therefore, the rise in foreign pollution influences the home consumers less
than the fall in domestic pollution amount. The global level of pollution falls as well.
If the government receives the contributions only from the supergreens, the maximization of its
objective function results in obtaining the tax rate:
t =
aGG↵(2  + ✓   2✓    1)
!(    1) +
↵(2    ✓    1)
    1
And with the change in the number of supergreens will have an ambiguous impact on the environ-
mental policy:
@t
@aGG
=
↵(2    2✓  + ✓   1)
!(    1)
In this case, the tax on the polluting good will be lower despite of the increase of proportion of
supergreens if 2 (1   ✓) + ✓ > 1. This means that if the pollution is transboundary, and the
spillover eﬀects are large, then the supergreens will achieve that the government implements lower
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taxes. The suﬃcient condition for this to be valid is that spillover eﬀects are   > 12 for any level of
transboundarity of the pollution ✓. With respect to the emissions damaging the home environment,
if the condition for the lowering the pollution tax with the increase of the supergreens is satisfied,
then also the condition for the emission leakage is satisfied (as  (2  ✓) > 1) 2 (1  ✓) + ✓ > 1)) ,
so the increase in the eﬀorts of the environmentalists will decrease the emissions despite of lowering
the environmental tax.
These results show that the tax falls only if the home consumers would be influenced negatively
otherwise. However, for the case with the supergreen lobby present, it might be optimal to support
lower tax on the home production of transboundary pollution in some cases. On the other hand,
the local environmentalist will always support higher tax on pollution.
If both green lobby groups pay their contributions to the government at the same time, then
the increase in the membership numbers of one lobby group will result in a change of tax described
above. The situation when the proportion of both local greens and supergreens changes is described
in the case 3.
3.1.3 Case 3: Production and Green Lobbies
Let us now consider that we have two types of environmental lobby groups: local greens and su-
pergreens, and the producer lobby groups. We assume as in Fredriksson (1997b) and Aidt (1998,
2005), in contrast with Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995) that the lobby groups are functionally
specialized. This means that the lobby’s goal is to aﬀect one particular issue instead of having
multiple goals, which is what is observed empirically (Marshall 1998). Both green lobby groups
can use their eﬀort to tax diﬀerent industries i depending on the type (local or transboundary) of
pollution each production process emits. The producer lobby group wants the tax to be lower. In
Fredriksson (1997a), the producer lobby advocates subsidy for the polluting industry; however, we
will follow the examples of Grossman and Helpman (1994), Fredriksson (1997b), Conconi (2003) or
others, where both green and the production lobby oﬀer contribution to the incumbent government.
On one hand, the lobby groups attempt to influence the environmental policy implemented by the
government, but as the lobbies take the contributions of the other lobby as given, not contributing
would also mean that the policy will be shifted in favor of the contributing lobby.
For a simple representation and interpretation, we consider only two goods i = {1, 2} whose by-
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product in the production process is local or global pollution: for i = 1, ✓ = 1, so good 1 is a local
pollutant, and for i = 2, ✓ = 0, and therefore, production of good 2 causes purely transboundary
pollution. We assume that the change of the tax on each of the good results in the same change on
its international price  1 =  1 =  . We continue with the assumption of symmetric countries, so we
have @Y@p =
@Y ⇤
@p⇤ and ↵i = ↵
⇤
i . On the producer side, two lobby groups can be formed advocating a
lower tax on the good they produce. The detailed derivation of the equilibrium tax is precised in
the appendix. The tax on the good 1, the local pollutant will be the following:
t1 =
↵1(aLG + !)
!
  a
P
1 Y1
! @Y1@p1
Notice that only the local lobby influence enters the decision of the government about the tax on
locally polluting good. The local pollution influences the local greens and all the consumers. The
impact of the production lobby is negative, as the the producers aim to lower the taxes, and the
weight of their influence depends on the size of their lobby compared to weight the government
attaches to social welfare and the supply of good 1 Y1.
The tax on the transboundary polluting good will be set to:
t2 =
↵2(aGG + !)(2    1)
!(    1)  
aP2 Y2
! @Y2@p2
The producers of good 2 and supergreens will fight for the decrease of the pollution tax if   > 1/2,
that is when the spillover eﬀects are large. In this case, both lobbies will achieve lower levels of
emissions than if the tax rose.
It is now simple to compare the optimal tax in the presence of lobbies with the Pigouvian levels.
Consider that we do not have any lobby groups, i.e ak = 0 for k = {LG,GG,P}. Then, the optimal
tax would be just t1 = ↵1 and t2 = ↵2(2  1)  1 = ↵2 + ↵2
 
  1 . In the case of local pollution, it is
optimal for the government to tax all production at the level it emits the pollutant. In the case of
transboundary pollution, the tax depends on the size of ratio    1 . It is straightforward to verify that
the optimal tax can become a subsidy if the spillover eﬀects are above the 1/2 level (i.e   > 1/2).
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3.2 Coordinated Policies
If the governments decide to coordinate their policies, they will set their environmental tax by
maximizing the weighted sum of the governments’ welfare (equation (9)) (Grossman and Helpman
(1995)):
!⇤G+ !G⇤ = !⇤
X
j
Cj(t) + !
X
j
C⇤j (t) + !
⇤! [W (t, t⇤) +W ⇤(t, t⇤)] j 2 {NG,LG,GG} (11)
In the coordinating equilibrium, the countries set the same tax on their markets. Keeping the
symmetry assumption, this implies that the imports (exports) do not change; therefore, the countries
do not experience any change in the emission leakage. Then, the change of emissions depends simply
on the change in production, which is described in the appendix.
The same applies for the foreign country: the consumers benefit from lowering the emissions at
home and from the lower foreign transboundary emissions. Again, we diﬀerentiate between three
cases with diﬀerent lobby groups. For most of the results, it is necessary to assume symmetry of the
countries. The influence of the asymmetry is discussed in the next section.
3.2.1 Case 1: National Green Lobby
From maximizing (11), we get that the national environmental group will lobby for the tax
t =
2↵(2  ✓)(aNG + !)
!
which is higher than the tax equilibrium tax with no lobby groups. In this case, the total emissions
will be unambiguously lower in both countries.
3.2.2 Case 2: Local Greens and Supergreens
If the policies in the case of local greens are adapted unilaterally, the pollution tax will be:
t =
↵(2  ✓)(✓aLG + !)
!
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The tax on the pollution will always increase. Compared to unilateral case, the tax increases in both
countries, and therefore, it lowers the pollution levels in both countries, and the world emissions fall.
In the case of supergreens, the coordinating governments will set the tax:
6(aGG + !)(1  ✓)↵
!
+ 2↵
Also in this case, the cooperation results in lower pollution levels on the global level. The tax
will be unambiguously higher if the proportion of greens increases. The drop of transboundary
emissions enters the weighted welfare function six times: first, such change aﬀects positively the
welfare of the consumer at home and abroad. Then, the welfare of the home lobby increases as the
transboundary pollution falls both from lowering emissions at home and abroad. Symmetrically, the
foreign supergreens are influenced the same way.
The cooperative policies are therefore unambiguously better for the global levels of emissions for
all formations of the lobby groups. If we also consider the producer lobby, it will have a negative
influence on the tax as described in 3.1.3.
3.3 Change of the Weight of the Social Welfare
In addition to changing the proportion of the environmentalists in the country, it is interesting to
also look at the case when the government increases the weight, !, it places on the social welfare.
First notice that the change in the tax level will not be always the same for all cases of the lobby
groups as the change will depend on the relative weight of the social welfare with respect to the
amount of the environmentalists. We find that in the presence of National Lobby, Local Lobby and
Supergreens, the tax changes in the following way:
National Lobby:
@t
@!
=  ↵a
NG(2    !    1)
!2(    1)
Local Greens:
@t
@!
=  a
LG↵✓
!2
Supergreens:
@t
@!
=  a
GG↵(  + ✓   ✓    1)
!2(    1)
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Notice that the equation representing the change of the tax is similar to the change in the
section 3.1 where we explored the increased proportion of the environmentalist: it diﬀers only by a
multiple of  ak! where k 2 {NG,LG,GG}. Therefore, if the government starts caring more about
the aggregate social welfare, the influence on the tax is the opposite of what the environmentalist
would have had, and the weight of such discount is given by the relative size of the environmentalist
groups with respect to the weight on the social welfare. Such result might not be what we would
first expect: the average consumers suﬀers from the pollution damage; however, the government
does not increase the tax with the increase of its concerns regarding the social welfare. Rather, it
acts against the wish of the environmentalists. We get similar results for the case with the producer
lobby: the government will implement an opposite policy of what the producers would lobby for. In
the last section that follows, we explore the asymmetries of the countries.
3.4 Asymmetry of the Countries
Up to now, we assumed symmetric economies in some parameters. However, asymmetry can be the
decisive element in the discussion about the tax policies. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the
situations in which the parameters diﬀer. Once more, we diﬀerentiate between the unilateral and
coordinated policies.
For all previous results, we assumed symmetry in the size of countries, pollution emitted per unit
of output and the change of output with respect to change in price, i.e ↵ = ↵⇤ and @Y@p =
@Y ⇤
@p⇤ . To
check how asymmetry will influence the tax, we proceed with setting the above parameters for the
foreign country being a multiple of the parameters in the home country( ). The computation and
results are reported in the appendix, part 2. We find that the pollution tax will be higher than in
the symmetric case only if   > 1 and under the condition that it increases with the higher influence
of environmentalists. Moreover, we calculate that in the case when we have only the local green
lobby, the size of the country or the pollution it emits per unit of output will imply higher tax with
the increase of their influence for   > 1. For the asymmetry in the price responses of the domestic
and foreign supply, we can proceed the same way: if the production shifts more rapidly with the
change in the producer price at a given point, then the tax applied in the home country will diﬀer
from the symmetric case by a multiple of the relative diﬀerence of the eﬀects. More details about
the influence on these parameters are in the appendix.
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In the coordinated policy choice, besides the symmetry assumption for the size of the country,
↵ and @Y@p , we also assume the same amount of environmentalists in both countries as well as the
weight attached to aggregate social welfare, i.e ak = ak⇤ and ! = !⇤. Here, we can proceed in a
similar way as with the previous calculations, and find that the small diﬀerence in ak and ak⇤, and
! and !⇤ will influence the policies similarly as the diﬀerences in size of the countries. A substantial
asymmetry in one of these parameters can imply that the governments fail to cooperate and set
their policies unilaterally.
4 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explore the environmental policies introduced by the government that
cares about the welfare of its citizens and the contributions from the lobby groups. Our addition to
the topic of environmental lobbying is in modeling lobby groups, which distinguish between local and
global pollution. We showed that in some cases, the environmental lobbying might have a negative
impact on the tax level, which is not true for the local lobbying. We questioned if the supergreen
lobby can balance out the eﬀects of the country implementing lower tax on transboundary pollution
than it is optimal, and we found that it will not be true for cases when the government implements
the tax unilateraly, the pollution is mostly transboundary, and spillover eﬀects are large: supergreens
will fight for lower tax. Our results for the cooperative policies show that the introduced tax will
imply lower global emissions. Moreover, we showed that if the government increases the weight
it attaches to the social welfare, it will not increase the environmental tax even if the average
consumer suﬀers from the pollution damage, rather, it will act contra-lobby. We demonstrated that
the asymmetries in some parameters will reinforce the tax levels in the case of national lobby and
supergreens if the asymmetry parameter in the foreign country is larger.
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Appendix
Part 1: Derivation of Optimal Tax
To find the environmental policy the government implements in the presence of the lobby groups, we
maximize the government welfare function, equation (9). We distinguish between unilateral policy
choice and cooperation between two governments.
Unilateral Policies
The maximization of (9) yields:
!
@W
@t
+
@W k
@t
= 0 k 2 {NG,LG,GG,P} (12)
as we know that change of contributions with the small change in the tax at the equilibrium point
is exactly equal to change of the lobby’s welfare with the change in tax as explained in the section
2.6.
Let’s recall the aggregate social welfare:
W (t, t⇤) ⌘ l +
NX
i
tiYi(pi, p
⇤
i ) +
NX
i
Ri(pi) +
"
NX
i
ui(Di(p
W
i )) 
NX
i
qiDi(p
W
i )
#
  Z(t, t⇤)
The change of the social welfare with the change in tax will keep the same form for all derivations
in this appendix:
@W
@t
= !

@(tY )
@t
+
@R
@t
  @q
@t
D   q@D
@t
  @Z
@t
 
which yields after substituting for the derivatives:
@W
@t
= !

Y (    1) + t@Y
@p
(    1) + Y  D    q@D
@t
 
✓
(    1)↵@Y
@p
+ (1  ✓) ↵⇤@Y
⇤
@p⇤
◆ 
(13)
Simplifying the above expression, we get the following expression:
@W
@t
= !

t
@Y
@p
(    1) +  (Y  D)  q@D
@t
 
✓
(    1)↵@Y
@p
+ (1  ✓) ↵⇤@Y
⇤
@p⇤
◆ 
For the individual lobby groups, the change of their welfare is following:
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1. National Green Lobby:
@WNG
@t
=  aNG
✓
(    1)↵@Y
@p
+ (1  ✓) ↵⇤@Y
⇤
@p⇤
◆
(14)
2. Local Green Lobby:
@WLG
@t
=  aLG✓(    1)↵@Y
@p
(15)
3. Supergreens:
@WGG
@t
=  aGG(1  ✓)
✓
(    1)↵@Y
@p
+  ↵⇤
@Y ⇤
@p⇤
◆
(16)
Assuming symmetry of the countries (i.e ↵ = ↵⇤ and @Y@p =
@Y ⇤
@p⇤ ), and simplifying the equation (12),
we get the optimal tax in the Section 3.1.
Coordinated Policies
We assume symmetry in the following parameters and derivatives: ↵, !, ak,
@Y
@p
, and the size of
the countries. Although this assumption is rather strong, it permits to explore asymmetries in these
parameters. Having identical countries in these parameters, however, does not imply that we can
find the optimal tax for one country and assume it is the same for the other; rather, we must keep
in mind the transboundary emissions that will aﬀect both countries.
When the governments cooperate, they will both implement the tax t on their polluting sectors.
Therefore, everything else kept equal, the fact that producer price falls in both countries by the
same amount t will imply that in both countries, the production drops and there is no change in
imports and exports. We have that the change of emissions at home and abroad is simply:
@E
@t
= ↵
@Y
@p
+ (1  ✓)↵@Y
@p
(17)
and
@E⇤
@t⇤
= ↵⇤
@Y ⇤
@p⇤
+ (1  ✓)↵⇤@Y
⇤
@p⇤
which is, following our assumptions, the same as (17). Then, substituting into (11), we get 1.
National greens
2aNG!

2↵
@Y
@p
+ 2(1  ✓)↵@Y
@p
 
= 2!2
@W
@t
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which yields the tax as given in 3.2.1. Similarly, for the local greens, the maximization of (11) gives:
2aLG✓↵
@Y
@p
= 2!2
@W
@t
Finally, in the presence of the supergreens, we get
2aGG

2(1  ✓)↵@Y
@p
 
= 2!2
@W
@t
By simplifying these equations, we get the same results as given in the section 3.2.2.
Part 2: Asymmetry Tax
We suppose asymmetry in emission per unit of output ↵, and/or the size of the country. As we set
↵⇤ =  ↵, where   is a positive coeﬃcient (if we assume that the foreign country is bigger and pollutes
more per unit of output,   is simply a product of these coeﬃcients). Then, the total pollution in
the home country is as follows:
@E
@t
= ↵
@Y
@p
+ (1  ✓)↵ @Y
⇤
@p⇤
(18)
Proceeding in a similar fashion as in the Part 1 of this appendix, we get the following tax in the
presence of given lobby: For the national lobby:
t =
↵
 
! + aNG
 
(  +   (1  ✓)  1)
! (    1)
For the local greens:
t =
aLG↵✓
!
+
↵ (  +   (1  ✓)  1)
(    1)
And finally, for the supergreens:
t =
aGG↵ [ (1  ✓)(1 +  )  (1  ✓)]
!(    1) +
↵ [  +   (1  ✓)  1]
    1
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